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Abstract:
This paper gives a detailed analysis of the perspectives of workers with low qualifications in
Germany under the twofold pressures of globalization and technological change. First, alter-
native explanations for the skill-bias in the development of labour demand are discussed, with
particular emphasis on the “trade versus technology” debate. The consequences of the demand
shift away from low-skilled labour in Germany are examined in a detailed empirical analysis
of the development of (un)employment problems differentiated for qualification groups.
Compared to other advanced economies, Germany shows a higher unemployment rate among
less-qualified workers which is generally associated with a lack of flexibility in the German
wage structure. However, an analysis of German, U.S. and British wage data based on the
Cross National Equivalent File (CNEF) does not confirm the assumption of a simple mono-
causal relationship between wage disparity and the intensity of group-specific unemployment.
Finally, some political approaches for an improvement of the job prospects of less-qualified
persons in Germany are outlined briefly and evaluated against the background of the empiri-
cal results.
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1. Introduction
The perspectives of low-skilled workers in the industrialized countries have deteriorated
in recent decades. In the United States, for example, a marked rise in wage inequality and low
and partly decreasing real wages for less-qualified employees (working poor) have been ob-
served. Germany, on the other hand, shows a higher unemployment rate among unskilled
workers which is generally associated with a lack of flexibility in the German wage structure.
The different labour market problems of low-skilled workers in the Western European coun-
tries such as Germany and in the United States are widely recognized as two sides of the same
coin, reflecting a structural change in the demand for labour in the more advanced economies
in favour of the high skilled and to the disadvantage of the low skilled (with different conse-
quences according to the country-specific extent of wage flexibility).
The aim of this paper is to give a detailed analysis of the perspectives of workers with low
qualifications in Germany under the twofold pressures of globalization and technological
change. We first focus on the different hypotheses in explaining the obvious relative fall in
demand for less-skilled labour in Germany. A lively debate has risen about the question
whether the deepening of interindustry trade with developing and newly industrialized
economies (NIE) or the so-called skill-based technical change drives the skill composition of
the labour force in the advanced economies. The paper summarizes the underlying theoretical
considerations of this debate and discusses the validity of the opposite hypotheses. Besides
interindustry trade, alternative channels through which globalization affects relative labour
demand are identified and evaluated. Furthermore, the relevance of wage rigidities to the rise
of unemployment of low-skilled workers in Germany is assessed on the basis of empirical
evidence, and implications for better job prospects of these workers are discussed.
Section 2 focuses on the main causes for the skill-bias in the development of labour de-
mand since the early 1980s, with particular emphasis on the “trade versus technology” debate.
In section 3 we give a detailed empirical analysis of the development of (un)employment
problems in Germany differentiated for qualification groups. Seventeen years after unification
there still exist important differences between West and East Germany. In section 3 we also
discuss the labour market risks for different skill groups in international comparison, whereas
section 4 focuses on the relative flexibility of the German wage structure. In particular we
compare the development of wage inequality in Germany with the development in the United
States and Great Britain since the 1980s on the basis of the Cross National Equivalent File
(CNEF). In section 5 we conclude with some economic policy consequences of our results.
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2. Causes of the skill-specific structural change in labour demand
Structural change in labour demand has often been interpreted against the background of
globalization in the last decade. Particularly the increasing problems of the less-qualified
workers, with greater emphasis on lower wages and poverty problems in the United States and
Great Britain and on unemployment problems in countries such as Germany and France, have
been widely attributed to the intensification of the international division of labour going along
with increasing interindustry trade of OECD countries with threshold and developing econo-
mies. The opening up of China, the rise of India and South-East Asian economies, Brazil,
Mexico, etc., and the integration of formerly socialist economies after the collapse of the So-
viet Union into the capitalist world economy, have strongly changed the relative scarcities of
the factors of production, to the advantage of capital and to the disadvantage of low-skilled
workers in the more advanced economies. According to neoclassical trade theory, the relative
changes in the remuneration rates of the factors of production were explained on the basis of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the factor-price equalization, and the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem. For the ‘demonstration’ of (un)employment effects the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) model only had to be enlarged by an element assuming a certain degree of flexibil-
ity/rigidity of relative wages, as it had been done by Krugman (1995) or Davis (1998). Thus a
globalization shock either leads to greater price effects or quantity effects in form of higher
unemployment rates of the less skilled, i.e. it depends on the degree of regulation of the labour
market, whether a structural change in labour demand primarily leads to a greater wage dis-
persion or higher unemployment of the less skilled. According to this view, institutional regu-
lations which create a barrier against a greater downward flexibility of wages, either in the
form of minimum wages or ‘generous’ social benefits, thus contribute to higher unemploy-
ment of the low-skilled workers. Krugman took “it as a maintained hypothesis that the Euro-
pean unemployment problem and the U.S. inequality problem are two sides of the same coin”
(1994, p. 37). The ‘two-sides–of–the-same-coin’– or Krugman hypothesis thus supposes an
empirical trade-off between joblessness and wage inequality of low-skilled workers in ad-
vanced economies.
Wood (1994) had already shown that beyond the HOS model additional mechanisms exist
which raise the qualification bonus above the one directly caused by trade with developing
countries. First, import competition has pushed away many activities from the market in the
advanced economies which contain a low amount of high-skilled labour. Therefore factor-
content studies of trade, which only calculate the existing factor proportions in the remaining
activities, underestimate the decline of demand for low-skilled labour as a consequence of
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international trade. Second, import competition from the South had stimulated the generation
and application of labour-saving technological change in the North, i.e. at least some of the
innovations which economists have made responsible for the rise of the qualification bonus
were triggered off by international trade itself.
However, many economists are sceptical against the hypothesis of an increasing interin-
dustry division of labour as the main cause of the erosion of wages and/or jobs of low-skilled
workers in advanced economies which are human capital abundant. Thus the exports of goods
and services of the newly industrialized economies stay well behind the volume of primarily
interindustry trade between OECD countries. In Germany as well as in other advanced
economies the employment share of the low-skilled workers has also declined in sectors
which are not directly exposed to import competition against the logic of the HOS model.
Therefore alternative approaches have been formulated to explain the development on the
labour market. Further strong candidates as main causes for the deteriorated income and/or
employment situation of the low-skilled workers in the advanced economies are changes in
labour supply and in institutional factors, structural change, and particularly a skill-biased
technological change.1
The controversy on the overall employment consequences of new technologies between a
labour displacement pessimism and a compensation optimism is one of the oldest in econom-
ics ever since Ricardo has discussed the machinery problem. The phenomenon has much in
common with the effects of free trade and a growing international division of labour: no doubt
beneficial for almost everybody in the long run, and in the aggregate normally also in the
short run, but it cannot be denied that in the short and medium run very often there are not
only winners but also losers. The political processes do not always work in a way that the
losers are compensated by the winners (see, e.g., Samuelson 2004), which would reduce the
resistance against increasing globalization among the low-skilled workers in the advanced
economies.
A skill-biased technological change with high probability plays a major role in the eco-
nomic decline of the less-squalified workers in the advanced economies. The implementation
of new technologies often leads to an increase of demand for high-skilled and at the same
time a decline for low-skilled workers as a consequence of dynamic substitution processes.
Technical progress thereby is of an asymmetric nature and a major cause for the structural
change in labour demand. In other words: “trade matters, but it is neither all that matters nor
the primary cause of observed changes” (Freeman 1995, p. 30).
1 See Grossmann (1999). For emphasis on structural change towards services as a decisive factor of a more un-
even distribution of income see Nollmann (2006).
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Since the mid-1990s economists argue on the relative weight of interindustry trade and a
skill-biased technological change for the labour markets in the advanced economies within the
so-called “trade versus technology” debate. In this context, a variety of empirical evidence
and methods have been used: factor content studies, implication tests, regression analyses
based on the HOS model, or the calibration of general equilibrium models. A majority of the
studies come to the result that technological change has been more important in its impact on
the structural change in labour demand.2 However, the overall result of the quantitative impor-
tance of the different causes empirically is still not yet clear. This holds in particular for the
development on the German labour market, due to a small number of studies existing, prob-
lems with the empirical data and insecurity about the appropriate methods to be applied. Fur-
thermore, there exists the conceptual problem that the two main causes are mutually depend-
ent. On the one hand, new major technologies, particularly in the transport sector, in informa-
tion and communication, have been a main driving force for globalization, as it had been the
case in the decades before World War I. On the other hand, globalization then and now has
significantly influenced the relative scarcities of factors of production, their remuneration
rates, the degree of inequality (see Williamson 1995) and thereby generated a factor price-
induced technological change. This mutual causality between trade and technology creates a
separation problem which, at least empirically, is difficult to overcome.
Furthermore, there exists an additional problem. “The argument against trade is based, in
part, on a misreading of the data. … This line of reasoning emphasizes trade in final goods
and ignores the globalization of production and recent dramatic increases in trade in interme-
diate inputs” (Feenstra and Hanson 2001, p. 46; our italics). Thus there is a tendency of an
increasing decomposition of the production process and to offshore certain value-added stages
into countries which show cost advantages. According to the comparative advantages defined
above companies in advanced economies primarily shift low-labour intensive parts of their
value-added chain into low-wage countries. As Feenstra and Hanson have shown within the
framework of outsourcing models, the trade with intermediate products thereby generated has
contributed to a reduction of the relative remuneration of low-qualified labour. Thus it had
been shown beyond the original Stolper-Samuelson model that further transmission channels
of globalization help to explain the deteriorated relative position of low-skilled workers on the
labour market in the advanced economies. Migration processes and technology transfer, for
example via foreign direct investment, are further causal factors which affect the labour mar-
ket. Summing up, it can be stated that globalization together with technological change has
2 See Heitger and Stehn (2003), OECD (2005a), and most recently IMF (2007, chapter 4).
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decisively contributed to the skill-biased structural change on the labour market in the ad-
vanced economies leading to the “pauperization” of the less qualified workers and exerting an
enormous pressure on them.
3. Employment problems of low-skilled workers
Having discussed the potential reasons for the demand shift away from low-skilled labour
we now focus on the consequences of this development for the German labour market. Usu-
ally a rather inflexible wage structure is assumed for Germany. So, according to the above-
mentioned “two sides of the same coin“ hypothesis, mainly employment effects can be ex-
pected. Indeed, a high level of unemployment has been regarded as one of the most urgent
social problems in Germany for years. The German unemployment rate was rising with every
economic slump since the mid-1970s - without declining to the previous level in the upswing
following the respective recession period. Low-skilled workers were affected more than oth-
ers by this disproportionate development and are now seen as a particular risk group on the
German labour market. The following section will examine the strength of the influence of
educational qualification on job prospects and on the individual risk of becoming unem-
ployed.
3.1 The structure of employment and unemployment in Germany
The influence of formal education on employment opportunities and risks is reflected, in-
ter alia, in the specific unemployment rates of different skill groups. Figure 1 shows the de-
velopment of the skill-specific unemployment rates and illustrates that the job prospects of the
low skilled have deteriorated above proportion with rising total unemployment in Germany.
While the unemployment rate of the mean skilled follows more or less the overall rate (about
two thirds of those in work belong to this skill group), employment opportunities of the un-
skilled and persons with an academic background diverge more and more, especially since the
early 1990s. University graduates and graduates of specialized colleges of higher education
(Fachhochschule) have obviously borne the lowest labour market risk over the whole obser-
vation period. Their unemployment rate remained stable at a low level. On the other hand,
unemployment among the low skilled rose almost constantly.
Fig. 1: Skill-specific unemployment rates in Germany
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Table 1: Structure of unemployment in Germany
Source: Reinberg and Hummel 2007, appendix 2a, authors’ illustration.
These figures indicate that effective policies to reduce the total level of unemployment
cannot ignore the specific labour market problems of the low skilled which will probably get
even worse in the future. Current forecasts of labour demand and its structure, such as the
“Deutschland Report 2030” of Prognos, predict a further reduction of simple jobs. Moreover,
cognitive requirements even of the so-called simple or low-skilled jobs presumably will in-
crease in the manufacturing and in the service sector so that a growing number of these jobs
could be occupied by higher-skilled workers (Kupka 2005, p. 13). Future shifts of the popula-
tion’s age structure to older cohorts don’t necessarily improve the job prospects of the low
skilled. On the contrary, after the relatively well-trained cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s will
have attained pension age, there will probably be a lack of qualified employees with negative
economic effects in particular for the low skilled (Brenke 2007, p. 79).
It should be kept in mind that the labour market position of less-qualified workers has de-
teriorated despite a shift of labour supply toward higher educational qualification. West Ger-
many as well as East Germany initiated an educational expansion after 1945. An improved
system of education in association with strong cohorts has notably increased the skill level of
the population over the last decades. In West Germany the labour force share of the unskilled
has declined sharply since the mid-1970s, whereas the shares of the mean and the highest skill
group have increased. However, the shares of the low skilled and the averagely skilled have
stagnated to a certain degree since the early 1990s (Reinberg 2004, pp. 61ff.). For the younger
cohorts of the labour force even a declining level of educational qualification can be observed
in recent years. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, the share of the 20- to 24-
year old population with at least a secondary education degree (high school or vocational edu-
cation) declined from 74.7% to 71.0% between 2000 and 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt
low skilled skilled high skilled low skilled skilled high skilled
specific unemployment rate1) 21.7 7.3 3.3 51.2 19.4 6.0
share of total unemployment2) 41.1 52.3 6.5 20.6 74.6 4.8
low skilled skilled high skilled low skilled skilled high skilled
specific unemployment rate1) 24.6 9.9 4.0 26.0 9.7 4.1
share of total unemployment2) 34.3 59.8 5.9 40.3 54.2 5.5
West Germany 2004 East Germany 2004
overall Germany 2004 overall Germany 2005
1) Percentage of civilian labour force with the same educational attainment (no apprentices) that is unemployed.
2) Percentage of all unemployed persons by educational attainment.
low skilled: without completed vocational training, skilled: apprenticeship / specialized vocational school ,
high skilled: college of higher education or university
Calculations of the “Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung“ (IAB).
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2006b, pp. 34f.). Children of immigrant families have a share much above average among
those without completed vocational training.4
Another problematic issue is the supposition that even in the case of a distinct and con-
tinuous boom there will be no important improvement of the employment opportunities for
low-skilled workers. Reinberg and Hummel (2005) point to the fact that in the past the reduc-
tion of low-skilled jobs didn’t stop or go into reverse even in times of strong economic growth
in Germany – at best a slowdown of job reduction was observed. The business cycle obvi-
ously had no stronger influence on the job losses of the unskilled or the massive job gains of
the university graduates. Therefore, it is rather questionable whether a continuous economic
growth above the German employment threshold could also create new jobs for the low
skilled.
Hence, the unfavourable labour market trend for the less qualified is not only reflected in
changing skill-specific unemployment rates but also in a shift of the employment structure. In
West Germany the share of the jobs which are subject to social insurance contribution and
which are occupied by persons without vocational qualifications actually declined from 30%
to about 17% between 1980 and 2002 (Kalina/Weinkopf 2005, pp. 2f.). The overall decline of
unskilled employment, however, in part involves contradictory processes. Kalina and Wein-
kopf (2005), for example, point to a rising employment of the low skilled in certain industries
respectively occupations between 1999 and 2002.5 Nonetheless, such positive employment
tendencies, especially in the service sector, obviously couldn’t stop the overall deterioration
of the labour market conditions for the unskilled. In this context, not only the continuous re-
duction of simple jobs due to rationalization seems to be relevant. Furthermore, there is indi-
cation of increasing displacement of low-skilled employees by higher-skilled workers. More
and more persons with a better educational attainment occupy the originally low-skilled jobs
during recessions and thus diminish employment opportunities for unskilled workers.
4 On the basis of the Mikrozensus (microcensus), Klemm (2001) finds out that in 1998 the share of young adults
without a completed vocational training was three times higher among foreigners than among German citizens of
the same age (more than one-third of the 20- to 25-year old foreigners had no vocational qualifications in West
Germany as well as in East Germany). Kupka (2005) argues that these figures imperfectly reflect the problems
of the children of immigrant families, since only German and foreign adolescents can be distinguished. Accord-
ing to the Mikrozensus 2005, however, there are more than 8 million German citizens with a migration back-
ground in addition to the 7.3 million foreigners in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a, pp. 73ff.).
5 Among others the hotel and catering industry, trade and commerce, health care and the cleaning industry can be
identified as “growth sectors” in this context.
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3.2 Skill-specific labour market risks in international comparison
Structural change that particularly puts pressure on the low skilled is not limited to Ger-
many. Nevertheless, the employment problems of the less qualified in Germany seem to be
different from the ones of most other advanced economies. OECD data can be used for an
international comparison of relative labour market risks of various skill groups. The annual
publication ”Education at a Glance“ contains skill-specific employment rates and unem-
ployment rates for all OECD member countries. The group-specific unemployment rate of the
unskilled in Germany is higher than in other major countries – and the German employment
rate of the lowest qualification group accordingly turns out to be below-average. However, the
latest figures for 2004 don’t confirm Germany’s position of “world champion” in the unem-
ployment rate of the low skilled as it is sometimes emphasized in the literature (Sinn 2005,
pp. 23f. and 34). According to the OECD calculations, the already very high German unem-
ployment rate of the lowest skill group of 20.5% (male and female labour force aged 25 to 64
years) is still surpassed by the Czech Republik (23.0%), Poland (27.8%) and Slovakia
(47.7%).6
Of course, it has to be considered that the level of overall unemployment in Germany is
higher than in many other developed economies. In 2006 the German unemployment rate was,
according to EUROSTAT, above EU average which itself clearly exceeded the U.S. and Japa-
nese reference values. Within the European Union unemployment rates vary widely and indi-
cate more or less independent labour markets, despite officially “free” movement of labour
(Nickell 2003, p. 25). To be able to compare the relative unemployment risks of the unquali-
fied, it is necessary to adjust for the different levels of total unemployment. In this context, it
is advisable to follow the approach of Nickell and Bell (1996) and to calculate ratios of the
skill-specific unemployment rates. Therefore, Table 2 shows, in addition to the specific un-
employment rates of the different skill groups, the ratio between the rate of the unqualified
and the rate of the university graduates.
The comparison of the job prospects of the low skilled in Germany, the Unites States and
Great Britain appears to be particularly interesting. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, whose
wage structures are assumed to be especially flexible, the unemployment rates of the unskilled
for 2004 were, as expected, lower than in Germany. At the beginning of the 1990s, however,
the situation on the labour markets was completely different. At that time, the unemployment
rate of the lowest skill group amounted to just 7.4% in Germany. This was unmistakably be-
6 The skill-specific unemployment rates published by the OECD differ from the ones presented in section 3.1. In
order to allow international comparisons, the OECD applies the ILO unemployment concept. Moreover, the skill
groups are partially defined in a different way.
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low the OECD average, whereas Great Britain and the United States evidently had above-
average rates. In the middle of the 1990s Nickell and Bell still dealt with the question why
low-skilled workers had better employment opportunities in Germany than in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, despite higher and less-flexible real wages for low wage earners. As a possi-
ble explanation the authors referred to the characteristics of the German education and train-
ing system. Nickell and Bell saw for the early 1990s a strong emphasis in the German school-
ing system on sustaining a high level of performance on the part of the bottom half of the abil-
ity range. Together with a comprehensive system of vocational training this would mitigate
many of the adverse consequences of the shift in labour demand away from the unskilled
(Nickell/Bell 1996, pp. 305ff.). Referring now to the relative unemployment risk of the low
skilled, table 2 shows for Great Britain and the United States a decline of the ratios between
the group-specific unemployment rates of the unqualified and the high qualified, especially
since the end of the 1990s. However, they still surpass the OECD average on the base of the
latest data. The German ratio, on the other hand, started below the average and rather stable
OECD level and rose more or less constantly over time. In 2003 it topped the British and the
American ratios for the first time.
Table 2: Labour market risks of different skill groups
in Germany, Great Britain and the United States
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2006, pp. 118f. and 2005, pp. 113f.), authors’ illustration.
1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
GER low skilled (LS) 7.4 13.3 15.4 15.9 13.9 13.5 15.3 18.0 20.5
skilled (S) 4.7 7.9 10.3 8.8 8.1 8.2 9.0 10.2 11.2
high skilled (HS) 3.2 4.9 5.5 5.0 4.2 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.5
ratio LS/HS 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7
GB low skilled (LS) 10.4 12.8 10.5 10.0 8.9 7.6 8.5 6.9 6.6
skilled (S) 6.5 7.5 5.0 4.9 4.6 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.7
high skilled (HS) 3.3 3.7 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.2
ratio LS/HS 3.1 3.4 4.1 3.7 4.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 2.9
USA low skilled (LS) 12.3 10.0 8.5 7.7 7.9 8.1 10.2 9.9 10.5
skilled (S) 6.5 5.0 4.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 5.7 6.1 5.6
high skilled (HS) 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.1 3.0 3.4 3.3
ratio LS/HS 4.2 3.6 4.1 3.7 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.2
OECD* low skilled (LS) 8.9 10.8 9.5 9.5 9.1 8.9 9.4 10.2 10.4
skilled (S) 5.9 7.3 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.2
high skilled (HS) 3.5 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.9
ratio LS/HS 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7
*) average for all OECD member countries
Number of 25-to -64-year-olds in unemployment as a percentage of the labour force aged 25 to 64,
by level of educational attainment.
Distinction of skill groups according to ISCED classification:
LS - Below upper secondary
S - Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
HS - Tertiary education
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In order to assess the labour market situation of the less-qualified persons in Germany, the
Deutsche Bundesbank also aims to adjust for the different height of total unemployment in the
advanced economies. For this purpose the Bundesbank compares in its Monthly Report of
January 2007 the unemployment shares (resp. the employment shares) of low-skilled persons
with their labour force shares (resp. population shares). In Germany the unemployment share
of the lowest skill group is, as expected, higher than the corresponding labour force share and
moreover, the employment share of the unskilled falls behind the population share. This diag-
nosis also applies, however, to the other member countries of the Euro Zone as well as Great
Britain and the United States.7 For Germany the relative contribution of the formally less
qualified to total unemployment (total employment) is high (low) but doesn't turn out to be
unusual in the context of a comparative countries analysis. Moreover, it has to be taken into
account that the low skilled represented only 13% of the German labour force in the year
2003 according to the OECD. The U.S. reference value of 10% is even below it, whereas in
countries such as France or Spain more than 30% respectively 50% of the workforce can be
allocated to the lowest qualification group. The OECD uses the ISCED scale (International
Standard Classification of Education) for the classification into different skill groups. This
classification is merely designed for formal education at school and so country-specific char-
acteristics such as the comprehensive system of education and training in Germany (the so-
called “duale Ausbildungssystem”) cannot be considered adequately. The Deutsche Bundes-
bank now assumes that the distribution of actual employment-relevant skills is not fundamen-
tally different for the developed economies. As far as the population subgroups are catego-
rized as “low-skilled” just on the basis of country-specific formal criteria, it follows from the
above assumption that the specific unemployment rate of a smaller subgroup must be higher
than the one of a bigger subgroup. For this reason as well as a varying level of total unem-
ployment, skill-specific unemployment rates are insufficient indicators for an international
comparison of the job prospects of low-skilled workers.
4. The flexibility of the German wage structure
Many economists assume a direct link between a lack of flexibility in the German wage
structure and the fact that the rate of unemployment of low-skilled workers in Germany is
significantly higher as compared to other OECD countries. The German Council of Economic
Advisors, for example, adopts this point of view in its Annual Report 2002/03: “In contrast to
other big industrialized countries, which have reduced their rates of unemployment, the Ger-
7 The analysis of the Bundesbank is based on data of the Labour Force Statistics of the OECD for the year 2002
resp. 2003.
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man wage structure according to qualification levels has mainly remained stable during the
last twenty years despite a demand shift away from the less skilled. Inevitably unemployment
must rise.”8
Notwithstanding the popularity and the plausibility of such a hypothesis, it is difficult to
operationalize and to quantify precisely the relationship between wage level or wage structure
and employment.9 Instead of testing causality explicitly we focus on a description of the wage
distribution. In order to get some information about the degree of wage flexibility in Ger-
many, wage inequality will be measured and compared with inequality values that can be ob-
served for other countries. For such an international comparative analysis the United States
seem to be an appropriate benchmark because the U.S. labour market shows a relatively low
level of market regulation. The British wage inequality is often seen as lying somewhere be-
tween the German and American level. So within Europe Great Britain should be a suitable
point of reference.
Harmonized data sets of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the American Pa-
nel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) rep-
resent the data basis for the following analysis of the intensity of wage dispersion. Section 4.1
first estimates the extent of wage inequality and outlines country-specific developments con-
cerning wage distribution in general. Section 4.2 deals with an examination of the relationship
between wage dispersion and formal educational qualification. For this purpose, wage differ-
ences between and within skill-specific groups are regarded.
4.1 Development of wage inequality in Germany, Great Britain and the United States
Previous estimations of German wage inequality differ depending on the data used and the
period under observation. These studies often confirm a stable and relatively moderate disper-
sion of labour earnings in Germany. For Schettkat (2006) this diagnosis is based on a limita-
tion of the observation period until the mid-1990s and on an examination of wages that is re-
stricted to full-time employed and men. Some data sets such as the IAB-Beschäftigten-
stichprobe10 don’t provide enough information about the individual working hours and thus
don’t allow calculating hourly wages. An analysis of monthly or yearly income data is open to
misinterpretation: income differences which are caused by different individual working hours
could be interpreted wrongly as a genuine divergence in wages. In order to avoid or at least to
limit this kind of misinterpretation, many empirical studies focus on full-time employed. Ine-
8 Sachverständigenrat Annual Report 2002/03, no. 461, authors’ translation.
9 There are various analytical difficulties such as a great heterogeneity of labour as a production factor (Fitzen-
berger/Garloff/Kohn 2003, pp. 1ff.).
10 IAB Random Sample of the Gainfully Occupied.
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quality studies also often use only income data of male workers because full-time employ-
ment is more spread among them than among their female colleagues.
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a wide-ranging representative longitudi-
nal study of private households and was started in 1984 by the DIW Berlin in cooperation
with Infratest Sozialforschung. It is one of the few surveys in Germany supplying detailed
information on individual number of working hours. This enables the derivation of gross earn-
ings per working hour and thereby the consideration of income data of full- and part-time
employees. Another decisive advantage of the GSOEP-Data is the integration in the Cross-
National Equivalent File (CNEF). This data set is provided by Cornell University and cur-
rently includes data from five country’s panel studies. The data from the national panel stud-
ies have been extracted and harmonized to facilitate cross-national comparative research such
as the following comparison of German, American and British wage dispersion.11
Figure 2 shows the level of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient for CNEF-
based wages per hour. There are clear differences between Germany, the United States and
Great Britain as well as between the eastern and western part of Germany. The rather low
intensity of wage dispersion in East Germany immediately after German reunification is not
surprising in view of a socialist policy of levelling out wage and earning differences in the
former German Democratic Republic (Möller 2005a, pp. 47f. or 2005b, p. 2). In the following
years, inequality of East German labour earnings increased and reached the West German
level roughly in the mid-1990s. The West German wage distribution unexpectedly proves to
be less stable than its British CNEF counterpart. Starting with a Gini-value above the U.S.
level in 1984, wage dispersion in West Germany declined notably until the early/mid-1990s.
In the second half of the last decade, on the other hand, the western part of Germany experi-
enced a significant rise in wage inequality. But this trend has lost its dynamics during the last
years and the inequality values stabilized below their initial level of the mid-1980s. The over-
all German wage inequality curve ran to a great extent parallel to the one of West Germany.
Except for the last two years of observation, the intensity of wage dispersion in the whole of
Germany is higher than in its western and eastern region. This shows that the overall German
inequality values are not just an average of the “regional disparities”. Differences of earnings
between West and East Germany are relevant, too.12
11 Due to strict data protection laws, researchers outside the European Union are allowed to process 95% of the
original GSOEP-CNEF sample only. German researchers though can work with the so-called $PEQUIV-data file
which is a 100% version of the harmonized GSOEP sample.
12 For the years after reunification the observable reduction of West-East income differences implies a lowering
influence on overall German inequality.
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Fig. 2: Development of wage inequality in Germany, the United States
and Great Britain (Gini coefficient)
Source: GSOEP/PSID/BHPS (harmonised data of CNEF resp. $PEQUIV-File), authors’ own calculations.
There exist other empirical studies that contradict the impression of a rigid German wage
structure by detecting growing wage dispersion since the mid-1990s.13 Furthermore, Gernandt
and Pfeiffer (2006) find declining decile ratios for West Germany between 1984 and 1994.
This indicates a certain wage compression - but the change of the inequality level is quite
small, so the authors don’t doubt the often assumed relative stability of the West German in-
come distribution until the mid-1990s. Especially Möller (2005a/b) and Brenke (2007) con-
nect the rising German wage inequality in the subsequent years with an augmentation of dis-
parity above-average in the bottom part of income distribution. Taking decile ratios as indica-
tors for the extent of wage dispersion at the lower and upper end of the wage scale (D9/D5
respectively D5/D1) an analysis of the harmonized GSOEP/CNEF data confirms this finding.
The value of the ninth decile over the median increased notably in East Germany during the
1990s, but in West Germany and in Germany as a whole the D9/D5-ratio changed only
13 See Becker (2005), Möller (2005a/b), Gernandt/Pfeiffer (2006) or Brenke (2007).
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slightly over the analyzed period. The German D5/D1-ratio, however, shows similar but even
more marked tendencies as described above for the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, the level of
wage inequality among low income earners is remarkably high in international comparison.
According to a study by the European Commission (2005) based on the Structure of Earnings
Survey (SES), the D5/D1-ratio for Germany was higher than for any other Western European
country in 2002 and was only exceeded by some new EU accession countries. An analysis of
current CNEF data results in a D5/D1-ratio that lies above the British and even the American
reference value.
However, regarding the Gini ratio, figure 2 proves that the intensity of wage dispersion in
Germany doesn’t reach the U.S. level despite widening wage inequality in the second half of
the 1990s. On the contrary, estimated German wage inequality stays clearly behind the
American level in particular for the last years under observation. Over a period of more than
20 years the U.S. Gini coefficient rises almost constantly and is finally notably higher than the
German Gini coefficient. British wage dispersion, on the other hand, fluctuates around a more
or less constant level and is exceeded by German index values at the end of the 1990s.
Blackburn (1989) proposed a convincing method to assess the economic significance of
differences in inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. The method makes use of the
relation F* F FG G k 2   , where F* is the income distribution that results if a lump sum tax k
is imposed on every individual belonging to the poorest 50% of the population in order to
finance a (fictitious) transfer of the same amount to every member of the richer half of the
population.14 Referring to the values of the overall German and U.S. Gini ratio in the year
2002, the so-called Gini criterion implies that, to obtain the same wage dispersion in Germany
as in the United States, the amount of k = 2.48 Euro would have to be taken from every indi-
vidual with an hourly labour income below the median in order to transfer it to those in work
whose wages per hour are above the median wage. This is equivalent to 17.21% of the overall
German average wage per hour in 2002 (arithmetic mean calculated on the basis of GSOEP).
In contrast, an adaptation of the German and British level of disparity would require a lump
sum tax transfer in the opposite direction (“from rich to poor”) of 1.55% of the average Ger-
man wage per hour.
To be able to assess the robustness of the previous results, the analysis of the CNEF data
has been carried out in diverse variants. An exclusion of part-time employees leads to lower
Gini values for all samples. Especially the estimation results for West Germany in the 1980s
14 Blackburn originally used this method to illustrate the economic relevance of a change in inequality over a
specific period of time. The application to differences in wage dispersion between various countries/regions
follows the analytical procedure of Biewen (2000).
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tend to be lower and reduce the extent of the observed compression of wages. The calculation
of group-specific disparities reveals a tendentially stronger inequality for women than for men
in Great Britain, East Germany and in particular in West Germany. For the United States,
however, the dispersion of male wages clearly exceeds the dispersion of female wages. All in
all, sensitivity analyses by means of the Gini ratio indicate a higher German wage inequality
relative to Great Britain and particularly relative to the U.S., if part-time employment as well
as income data of women are taken into consideration. Furthermore, alternative measures of
inequality were calculated as supplements to the Gini coefficient. More or less the same ten-
dencies of development in wage inequality can be detected on the basis of the D9/D1-ratio,
various Atkinson inequality measures (with = 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2) as well as the general en-
tropy indices I0 (mean logarithmic deviation), I1 (Theil index) and I2 (transformed coefficient
of variation).15 On the other hand, the relative height of the British estimation results seems to
depend to a greater extent on the choice of the disparity index. The figures of the mean loga-
rithmic deviation, for example, show a marked rise of the British wage inequality over the
analyzed period and hence, in contrast to the estimation results for the Gini coefficient, also
always a more intensive wage dispersion in Great Britain than in Germany. The extent of the
differential between the measured wage inequality in Germany and the United States also
partially depends on the index used. Regarding, for instance, the D9/D1-ratio, the rise of ine-
quality in Germany since the mid-1990s goes beyond the one indicated by the Gini coefficient
and thus leads to a convergence of the German and American level of wage dispersion. How-
ever, except for the D5/D1-relation, the conclusion of a higher disparity in the United States
than in Germany proves to be robust to alternative inequality indices.
Freeman and Schettkat (2001) associate the weaker dispersion of German labour earnings
with a narrower distribution of skills. But even adjusted for skills the authors find that Ger-
many has a more compressed wage structure than the United States. Moreover, the German
welfare state reduces notably the inequality of market incomes. Especially in East Germany
the redistributive effects are unique in international comparison (Frick/Goebel et al. 2005, p.
67 and Goebel/Habich/Krause 2004, pp. 626f.). Because of the redistribution of income as
well as additional sources of income at the household level, incidentally, no close relationship
exists between individual wages and individual economic wealth in Germany (Becker 2005,
p. 282 and Sachverständigenrat 2006, no. 35).
15 The calculation of the Gini ratio as well as all other inequality measures was performed by taking the available
CNEF sample weights into consideration.
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4.2 Distribution of wages and educational qualification
In order to analyse the relevance of formal educational qualification for the distribution of
labour earnings, it is advisable to disaggregate the sample population into disjoint subgroups.
Corresponding to the analysis of the employment structure, it suggests itself to divide the
work force into a subpopulation with a low, a medium and a high level of qualification.16 On
the basis of the distinction of different skill groups, subgroup inequalities have been estimated
using the Gini coefficient and the mean logarithmic deviation. The increase in wage inequal-
ity in the United States is particularly pronounced for the high skilled, whereas the dispersion
among the low skilled was even declining in recent years but without falling behind the level
of income inequality among unskilled workers in Germany. In West Germany the subgroup
disparity of university graduates is widely stable over the whole observation period while the
tendencies of development in wage inequality are mainly reflected in the history of the spe-
cific disparity of the low and medium education group.17
In addition to the analyses above, the so-called decomposition of inequality presents an
appropriate method to assess and to quantify the contribution to overall inequality of inequal-
ity with and between the different skill-specific subgroups of the population. The mean loga-
rithmic deviation (MLD resp. I0) for example is a member of the Generalised Entropy class of
inequality measures which all satisfy the axiom of additive decomposability. This means that
the estimated overall inequality can be split into a between-group and a within-group compo-
nent (Itotal = Iwithin + Ibetween). The between-group inequality is equivalent to assuming that each
group member has the same income (the mean income of the group). The within-group ine-
quality of I0, on the other hand, is measured by calculating the wage dispersion within each
subgroup and summing them up, using as weight the corresponding population share. The
indicator Rbetween = Ibetween / Itotal can be seen as the analogue of the R2-statistic used in regres-
sion analysis (ANOVA) and represents the amount of inequality explained by population
characteristics. The examination of all CNEF samples shows that only a very small part of
total inequality can be explained by educational qualification. High within-group components
indicate that the division of the population into only three skill groups, as described above, is
a problematic oversimplification. The often-used classification of persons in work into three
16 Such a disaggregation can be put into practice for German and US CNEF data on the basis of the variable
”Education With Respect to High School“. Unfortunately, this variable is not available in the British data set.
17 It should be borne in mind that the composition of the various samples is in part quite different. The CNEF
population shares of university graduates in the United States for example are more than 25 respectively 30 per-
centage points above the proportions of high-skilled labour in West and East Germany. In the East German sam-
ple, furthermore, a high level of subgroup disparity of the unskilled goes together with a very low population
share of low-skilled individuals.
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or just two qualification levels does not capture adequately the heterogeneity of labour as a
production factor. Nevertheless, Schettkat (2006) points to findings that detect high wage dis-
persion even within narrowly defined skill groups. Therefore, he emphasizes another attempt
to explain high wage differentiation among individuals of the same education level: contrary
to the model of perfect competition, divergence between wage level and value of the marginal
product because of market imperfections (for instance in the case of a monopsonistic labour
market) or institutional influences should be taken into consideration.
Table 3: Wage inequality decomposition by subgroup (MLD*)
Source: GSOEP/PSID/BHPS (harmonised data of CNEF resp. $PEQUIV-File), authors’ own calculations.
Between-group disparities are even lower, if the sample population is disaggregated by
gender instead of educational qualification. Table 3 illustrates that in 2002 the belonging to a
certain skill group was unambiguously the more important determinant of wage dispersion.
But that is not always true for previous years of observation. A long-term comparison of the
inequality effects of the different socio-economic characteristics proves that “gender” has
become less significant in relation to “educational qualification” in West Germany and the
United States. In both countries the rank order of the inequality contributions changed be-
tween the reference years 1984 and 2002.18
5. Economic conclusions
Globalization and skill-biased technological change have contributed substantially to the
decline of demand for low-skilled labour in the industrialized countries. Like most advanced
economies, Germany increasingly specializes in goods and services of high quality and the
low skilled are at risk of becoming losers of modernization. Section 3 has shown that the em-
18 CNEF sample weights could not be used for the decomposition analyses. In order to avoid a stronger bias of
the estimation results, the GSOEP high income subsample G and the PSID low income subsample have been
excluded from the analysis.
1984 2002 1984 2002
between-group inequality 4,3% 10,0% 5,0% 5,0%
within-group inequality 95,7% 90,0% 95,0% 95,0%
between-group inequality 10,9% 12,8% 11,1% 5,5%
within-group inequality 89,1% 87,2% 88,9% 94,5%
gender
West Germany
USA
Disaggregation by: education level
*) Decomposition analyses based on mean logarithmic deviation (MLD=I0).
Hourly wages derived from gross labour earnings of all full-time and part-time employment / self-employment (including
bonus and special payments) on an individual yearly basis and from annual number of working hours.
Education levels according to ISCED classification (low, medium, high).
The annual details refer to the year in which income was realized (the year before data collection).
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ployment opportunities for persons without completed vocational training have deteriorated
systematically and worsened compared to other qualification groups since the mid-1970s. But
how can the job prospects of the less qualified in Germany be improved? The economic de-
bate focuses on training strategies and proposals for enhancing flexibility of the German wage
structure. Now, these political approaches shall be outlined briefly and evaluated against the
background of the empirical results described above.
One way to mitigate the negative consequences of the shift of labour demand is to adapt
the qualification structure of labour supply. Jan Tinbergen inferred already in the year 1975
that “… it is a ›race‹ between supply (by education) and demand (by technological develop-
ment) which determines the changes in relative scarcity of any type of manpower” (Tinbergen
1975, p. 55). In Germany a process of educational expansion has increased the skill level of
the population over the last decades. However, since the early 1990s this development has
stagnated to a certain degree and, furthermore, the share of younger Germans with less than
upper secondary education even rose in recent years (Reinberg 2004, p. 66; Statistisches Bun-
desamt 2006b, p. 34). A further expansion and improvement of the system of education and
vocational training might counteract the trend of stagnation. Some below-average perform-
ances of German students in OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA) with especially bad results for children of immigrant or socially disadvantaged fami-
lies raise the question whether the characteristics of the German education and training system
still ensure better job prospects for the students at the bottom half of the ability range, as it
was assumed for example by Nickell and Bell (1996). In addition to an improvement of for-
mal education and of training measures for unemployed workers, stronger incentives for ad-
vanced training of already employed persons are considered. This should contribute to the
individual’s long-term employability (livelong learning) but also improve the employment
opportunities for the less qualified by reducing the number of low-skilled jobs occupied by
higher-skilled employees (activation of mobility chains) (Albers 2005, pp. 399ff.).
However, an adjustment of the skill level of the labour force needs time and can rather be
seen as a long-term strategy. In the short term, many economists and politicians expect to
achieve better job prospects for the low skilled with the aid of a stronger wage differentiation.
It is often assumed that Germany has a relatively compressed wage structure with a lack of
downward flexibility. Negative employment effects, in particular for less-qualified workers,
can be derived from this assumption theoretically. In this context the concrete political pro-
posals aim at more flexible contractually agreed minimum wages and at the elimination of the
"wage competition" of the German welfare state (Sinn 2005, p. 22). Additional employment
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opportunities for low-skilled workers due to a reduction of labour costs are expected particu-
larly in the German service sector - mainly in the area of personal consumption and household
services (Schettkat 2006, p. 56 or Greifenstein 1999, pp. 8ff. and 40). New low-paid jobs,
however, can only be occupied if the unemployed are willing to re-start work. In order to in-
crease the difference between the income of low-paid workers and the social benefits for un-
employed persons, it is proposed to subsidize less-productive labour.19 Both wage subsidies
for employers and so-called “combi-wages” for employees, i.e. a combination of usual wage
payments and public transfers, have been intensively discussed in Germany. However, nota-
bly poverty effects are possible if subsidies are financed by reduced social benefits and if the
additionally “activated” labour supply doesn’t meet the requirements of labour demand
(Dietz/Koch/Walwei 2006, p. 6). Weinkopf and Jaehrling (2005), for instance, criticize that
the “combi-wage” approaches underestimate the actual qualification requirements of the so-
called simple jobs. Hence, staffing problems in the low-wage sector cannot be merely as-
signed to lacking financial incentives.
In Germany the opponents of the strategy of stronger wage differentiation point to socio-
political problems. They presume that there is less acceptance for a reduction of social bene-
fits and an expansion of the low-wage sector in Germany than for example in the United
States. The social price appears too high to them – in particular in view of an employment
dividend that is in their judgement uncertain (or even negative because of a loss of purchasing
power). Our analyses of the CNEF data as well as some other recent empirical studies detect
rising wage inequality in Germany since the mid-1990s. Moreover, Bellmann and Gartner
(2003) identify increasing educational wage premia in Germany in the 1990s. Despite increas-
ing wage dispersion and declining relative wages, the group-specific unemployment rate of
the unskilled rose considerably. Furthermore, there has already been an expansion of the
German low-wage sector mainly due to a growing number of precarious jobs in recent years
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2007, pp. 35 and 38). The assessment of the size of the low-wage sec-
tor is difficult - conceptually as well as with respect to the data available. As a rough refer-
ence value, the German Council of Economic Advisors indicates that about one fifth of Ger-
man employees work in the low-wage sector which, therefore, has a usual size in a cross-
country comparison (Sachverständigenrat 2006, no. 19ff.). After atypical work has risen
sharply since the end of the 1990s, about 20% to 40% of all working persons without a com-
19 A (actual or just assumed) lack of productivity is associated with the formally less qualified as well as with
long-term unemployed persons. More than 60% of all unemployed persons are either already unemployed for
more than 12 months or low-skilled. Nevertheless, the two groups are not congruent with each other. On the
contrary, it is found that the level of educational attainment has no important effect on unemployment duration
(Sachverständigenrat 2006, no. 14).
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pleted vocational training are only marginally employed, with an income below the low earn-
ings threshold (Reinberg and Hummel 2005). The low-wage sector, however, is not only
dominated by the low skilled. Labour market analyses rather indicate that the formally un-
skilled and better-qualified workers compete even for simple and low-paid jobs (Sachver-
ständigenrat 2006, no. 27).
On the search for alternative political approaches the critics of the wage flexibility strat-
egy not only focus on rising employment in the United States and Great Britain but also on
successful employment policies in other countries such as the Netherlands or the Scandina-
vian countries. These countries are regarded as examples for a successful labour market inte-
gration of the low skilled that could be realized without the price of increasing wage inequal-
ity, or even giving up the idea of the traditional European welfare state.20 Furthermore, How-
ell et al. (2007) have systematically assessed the evidence of cross-country regression litera-
ture and they conclude that a variety of labour market models can be consistent with good
employment performance. It is argued that a too strong focus on wage rigidities could result
in disregarding other promising political approaches. Flassbeck and Spiecker (2001), for ex-
ample, emphasize the general necessity of a consistent macroeconomic policy aiming at re-
ducing unemployment. In this context, they conclude that a considerable part of the current
employment problems of low-skilled workers is due to a certain passivity of German policy-
makers in the last decades. Furthermore, a comprehensive reform of the German tax system is
discussed. New labour market impulses, particularly for less-productive workers, might be
initialized by reducing the difference between gross and net incomes (Dietz/Koch/Walwei
2006, p. 6).
The arguments of protagonists and opponents of a stronger wage differentiation have to be
confronted with the results of empirical analyses. Recent studies show an increasing wage
inequality in particular in the bottom half of German income distribution since the mid-1990s.
Our analyses of CNEF wage data confirm these findings but also detect a wage compression
in West Germany in the second half of the 1980s. The gap between German and U.S. inequal-
ity is currently higher than 20 years ago. Is wage inequality in Germany thus still too low to
cause notable employment effects or, however, already so high that there is reason to demand
the introduction of statutory minimum wages? This question cannot be answered easily on the
basis of the recent statistical findings. Research results depend among other things on the data
used. Our examination of CNEF data, moreover, has illustrated that the definition of the sam-
20 In 2004 the relative unemployment risks of the low skilled in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and the
Netherlands (in analogy to table 2 indicated by the ratios of the group-specific unemployment rates of the lowest
and highest skill group) were below the OECD average and thus also below the British and the US level.
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ple population or even the choice of the inequality measure can also influence the estimation
results. Furthermore, the evaluation of German wage inequality and employment performance
in a cross-country comparison implies the danger of arguing with “anecdotic evidence” as a
result of a conscious choice of the countries of reference. Generally, data selection, the ana-
lytical approach and the interpretation of the results in the economic debate are not always
independent of political ideas and concepts. Anyway, the assumption of a simple monocausal
relationship between wage disparity and the intensity of unemployment among low-skilled
workers, according to the„two-sides of the same coin“-hypothesis, cannot be confirmed by
the empirical findings presented above.
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